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This paper explores the relationship between modality and fiction, particularly 
in regard to questions asked by both about identity of objects across worlds or fictions 
and about how the relationship between fictional or possible objects and their 
properties should be explained. On the latter question, it concludes that, while the 
exemplifying/encoding distinction as spelled out by Edward Zalta is problematic, the 
distinction captures an important intuition and should be re-imagined in such a way as 
to avoid those problems. Additionally, the analysis of both questions draw out strong 
parallels between fictions and possible worlds indicating that the distinction will apply 
in a similar way to both. 
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i.  Introduction 
Among the most interesting questions of metaphysics are those regarding the 
ontologies of possibility and of fiction. And there seem to be many parallels between the 
two—after all, on the surface, fiction seems like a paradigmatic example of things that 
are possible but not actual. On the other hand, fairly convincing arguments have been 
made, famously by Saul Kripke and followed by many others, that fictions are actually 
not possible worlds, and that has been the end of it. 
However, the parallels still exist that made that naïve view of fiction as a 
paradigmatic example of possibility so compelling. In this paper, we will consider the 
parallels between the two by starting with a particular theory of fiction and examining 
whether or not our choice of modal theories is significantly impacted. We will work with 
an artifactual theory of fiction, a take on an abstract object theory—in which fictional 
characters are taken to exist as abstract objects—that I find particularly compelling. This 
is certainly not the only theory with the potential to bring out parallels with modality, but  
it is one that is compelling to me, so in absence of an obvious theory of fiction that seems 
right to everyone, it makes a fine place to begin. 
We will then examine what lessons the artifactual theory of fiction can teach us 
about modality. In particularly, we will consider how the artifactual theory handles 
questions of identity of fictional characters and how fictional characters relate to their 
properties. In the former case, we will see how familiar arguments about fiction elicit 
echoes about modality, and indeed suggest a conception of modality in which the actual 
world has some priority over other possible worlds. In the latter case, we will consider 
the exemplifying/encoding distinction. This is rejected by Amie Thomasson in her 
development of the artifactual theory, but it is compatible with the artifactual approach 
more broadly and has been suggested by other abstract object theorists. We will reject the 
distinction as it stands but recast it in a way that solves some of the problems facing the 
distinction as currently understood. In doing so, we will be able to apply to the distinction 
not only in the case of fiction but in the case of modality as well. We will certainly 
maintain the Kripkean line that there are major differences between fictions and possible 
worlds, but our discussion of these two questions will allow us to develop a theory that 
accentuates the similarities and remains both intuitive and parsimonious. 
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ii.  Scene-setting
If we're to determine how closely we can parallel the artifactual theory of fiction 
is to theories of possible worlds, it is first worthwhile to briefly survey the landscape. We 
will lay out exactly what the artifactual theory is, and we will present for reference other 
abstract object theories of fiction—they will be instructive, even when they are 
implausible. We will then consider two theories that present possibilia as abstract objects. 
If the artifactual theory is to find parallels to modality, these theories will be good places 
to look. 
As stated, we will focus on the artifactual theory of fiction, but if we're to explore 
parallels between an abstract object theory of fiction (of any kind), it's certainly worth 
first giving some attention to someone who already has theories of both fiction and 
modality as non-concrete: Edward Zalta. Zalta famously drew the distinction between 
exemplifying and encoding properties. Concrete objects exemplify properties, and 
abstract objects exemplify certain properties and encode others. Concrete objects cannot 
encode properties, and, while abstract objects can exemplify properties (such as “being 
abstract”), the introduction of encoding allows us to solve significant intuitive challenges 
when applying an abstract object theory to fiction. Zalta sees fictional entities as abstract  
objects, encoding the properties ascribed to them in the stories. For instance, Sherlock 
Holmes exemplifies the property  “is written about by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle” but 
encodes the properties “smokes a pipe,” “solves crimes,” and “lives on Baker Street.” 
Zalta claims that essentially abstract objects are individuated by the properties they 
encode and necessarily encode the same properties in every possible world—fictional 
entities encode their properties even in worlds in which their authors do not exist. 
Additionally, that set of properties by which they are individuated can be incomplete (we 
may never know whether or not Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his back) or even 
inconsistent.1
Amie Thomasson, on the other hand, while seeing fictional characters as abstract 
objects, sees them as man-made, created by and dependent on their authors. On this view, 
the artifactual view on which we will focus, fictional characters are not necessarily 
existent—they exist only in the worlds in which their creators create them—but are 
necessarily abstract. On this she agrees with Zalta: fictional characters do not exist as 
flesh and blood individuals in any possible world. But in addition to her disagreements 
about the dependence of fictional objects on their authors, she's not comfortable with 
Zalta's views about encoding properties, rather retreating back to the concept of pretense. 
We don't really ascribe properties to fictional objects (well, we ascribe the properties of 
“being fictional” or “being created by Conan Doyle,” but not properties like “being a 
detective” or “smoking a pipe”), we rather pretend to ascribe properties in the context of 
the story.2   When we say things like “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe” are true, we do not 
mean they are genuinely true but that they are true according to the story—all such 
statements come with a unspoken “according to the story” operator that we only pretend 
is absent. While there are strong intuitions supporting the pretense view, it does seem to 
lack something, in that it fails to get at the truth in statements about fiction. Even though 
1 Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic.” 
2 Thomasson, Amie. Fiction and Metaphysics. 105
4
abstract objects can't smoke pipes, it seems that “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe” is true 
in some sense deeper than this view allows. It seems wrong to just leave it at “the stories 
say Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe.”  Later we will consider a modification that will 
bring pretense closer in line with intuitions about fiction. 
Now that we have glanced at a couple of abstract object theories of fiction, 
including the artifactual theory on which we will draw most heavily, let's consider a 
couple modal theories in which we might look for parallels. Again, a first place to look 
might be Zalta, who had a theory of the possible worlds that cast the merely possible as 
non-concrete. However, it diverges sharply from his theory of fiction. In order to simplify 
his quantified modal logic and preserve the Barcan formula, Zalta, along with Bernard 
Linsky, accepts a metaphysics in which everything that possibly exists actually exists. 
But they still want to preserve the driving force behind our intuitions that there are some 
things that could have been real that in fact are not. To do this, they reinterpret “possible, 
not actual” as “possibly concrete, actually non-concrete.” This gives us a thing that exists 
in the actual world to which to ascribe properties, but it also gives a meaningful sense in 
which our intuitions that said thing isn't real are accurate.3
However, while Linsky and Zalta admit the contingently non-concrete—things 
like merely possible people—into their ontology, they draw a sharp distinction between 
those objects and essentially abstract objects. Contingently non-concrete objects are 
concrete in other possible worlds. Essentially abstract objects, obviously, are not. 
Contingently non-concrete objects may be confused with essentially abstract objects 
because they're not concrete, but they don't have many other features of abstract objects. 
3 Linksy and Zalta. “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic.” 
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For instance, they don't encode properties.4 It seems that they're primarily in the ontology 
to simplify the logic and allow us an actual object to reference when making modal 
claims. Beyond that, they don't do a lot of theoretical heavy lifting. Merely possible and 
fictional objects share existence in all possible worlds and non-concreteness, but the 
fictional and not the merely possible are essentially abstract, and the fictional, unlike the 
merely possible, have their properties necessarily. While this does make it clear what the 
contingently non-concrete are not, it remains obscure just what they are—it seems that 
they are a subset of abstract objects that have almost nothing in common with any other 
abstract objects. We will seek to draw a closer, and hopefully less obscure, parallel 
between the fictional and the possible. 
Alvin Plantinga also has a theory that eschews the merely possible in favor of 
something actual and abstract. Instead of theorizing about people and windows and 
doorknobs and sculleries, he theorizes about essences of people and windows and 
doorknobs and sculleries. The essence of Socrates is a set of properties, perhaps just 
“being identical with Socrates.” This essence exists in all possible worlds whether or not 
anything in that world exemplifies that essence. What exists only in the worlds with 
Socrates is something exemplifying that essence.5 Possible worlds, on Plantinga's view, 
are maximally consistent states of affairs. He does remain agnostic on what exactly states 
of affairs are—whether chunks of the world or propositions6--and we will try to be 
similarly general. 
4 Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. “In Defense of the Contingently Non-Concrete.” 
5 Plantinga, Alvin. “Actualism and Possible Worlds.” 
6 IBID. 
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We will focus on the artifactual theory of fiction and determine whether it 
influences our choice of modal theory. We will see that the parallels between fiction and 
possible worlds are stronger than those proposed by Zalta's theory but do not require 
proposing actual abstract objects to stand in for the merely possible, as on Plantinga's. 
Rather, we will consider how objects relate to their properties in fiction and in possible 
worlds and draw strong parallels there. Additionally, we will see that strategies for 
identifying characters across fiction may be helpful for identifying objects across possible 
worlds. 
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iii.  Questions of Identity
One problem facing both theories of fiction and theories of possibility is identity. 
There is strong intuitive pull to say that the same character can be contained in multiple 
works of fiction and that the same person can be contained in multiple possible worlds. 
After all, Hercule Poirot appears in a great many Agatha Christie stories. Do we really 
want to say that characters are bound to a single work of fiction, thus admitting a great 
multitude of Poirots, all sharing the same basic characteristics and filling the same roles 
in the same writer's work? And even if we're inclined to take the multitude of Christie's 
novels as one larger work containing one Poirot,7 we're still faced with the same problem, 
as there are other unauthorized works—that cannot reasonably be considered part of the 
larger work—that borrow characters. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead wouldn't 
make much sense if it weren't about the actual characters from Hamlet. 
The pull to identify people across possible worlds is similarly strong. If modal 
claims are to be explained by possible worlds, then the fact that I could have dropped out 
of college to pursue a career as a professional soccer player (full disclosure: this would 
not have worked very well) needs to be explained by there being another possible world 
in which I drop out of college to pursue a career as a professional soccer player. If it's just 
a world in which someone like me in certain respects drops out of college to pursue a 
career as a professional soccer player, it just doesn't seem to get the job done. Of course, I 
already admit that someone like me could have done so. But I wanted to say that I could 
have done so. And it seems like that requires another possible world that has me in it. It 
7 Which leads to a whole host of other problems, discussion of which we'll leave for another time. 
has been argued famously by David Lewis that this is nonsense and that a sufficiently 
similar possible person is all we could ever need (or get), but there is at least a strong 
initial pull towards the conclusion that the same people should exist in multiple possible 
worlds. 
Not only do the two theories face similar challenges, they encounter similar 
problems with purported answers. For instance, one may try to identify characters across 
fictions and people across possible worlds by a set of properties they have in common. 
But this is doomed to fail, for familiar reasons. Aristotle may not have done any of the 
things we ascribe to him (being a philosopher, teaching Alexander the Great). And I could 
write a book (an admittedly boring one) about the amazing adventures of a Sherlock 
Holmes who decided to forgo detective work in favor of becoming a dentist. On the other 
side of the coin, it's possible that someone else could've done the things Aristotle is best 
known for (been a Greek philosopher who taught Aristotle), and fictions could be written 
about different pipe-smoking British detectives. It's hard to see how a list of identifying 
properties could be minimal enough to escape the first problem and maximal enough to 
escape the second. 
So, if the two areas have similar challenges and similar problems with meeting 
those challenges, can they avail themselves of similar solutions? In particular, does the 
abstract object theorist about fiction have any resources that lend themselves to similar 
use in theories of modality? Amie Thomasson offers that instead of trying to distinguish 
fictional characters solely by their properties, “we may get farther by treating fictional 
characters as historical entities individuated at least in part by the circumstances of their  
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creation.”8 
The idea here is to say that a necessary condition of one fictional character being 
identical to another is that the author of the latter intended to refer to the former when 
creating the work of fiction. So Poirot from Murder on the Orient Express and Poirot in 
Death on the Nile are the same not because they have similar properties but because 
Christie was referring to the character from the former when writing the latter. This also 
explains the case of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, as well as the entire 
phenomenon of Fan Fiction, in which people write their own stories about characters 
from more famous works. It also explains why we don't identify characters who happen 
to share similar properties. Stories about pipe-smoking British detectives are not all about 
Sherlock Holmes because the authors weren't all writing about the character contained in 
the work of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
Does any of this help solve problems in the metaphysics of modality? Not as 
much as one might hope. The suggestion that we identify people not by properties but “at 
least in part by the circumstances of their creation” has some application: the necessity of 
origins thesis has significant traction in discussions of modality, so we see some parallel. 
Both fictional objects and regular objects can be picked out by certain facts about their 
origins.  But beyond that, there aren't significant parallels allowing one to bring the 
fiction solution to bear on the modal problem. For starters, possible worlds aren't created 
one-by-one. So, unlike in the case of sequels being written to an individual novel, we 
can't look at one possible world created first and then check to see if the next world 
created references it. 
8 Thomasson. Fiction and Metaphysics. 62
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Still, one may think a parallel between the author of a fictional character and the 
parents of a person may be strong enough to allow for similar responses. We may take the 
element of succession out of the fictional case by supposing an author works concurrently 
on several novels, all about the same character who had not previously been introduced. 
Is this not similar to a person being born of the same parents in many possible worlds, 
although there is not one world being referenced by the others? While there are 
similarities, there is one vital difference that prevents the solution. There is no question 
about the identity of the author concurrently writing the fictions.9 There is, however, a 
question about the identities of the parents of the person we're trying to identify across 
possible worlds. If we don't already know how to tell whether multiple fictions contain 
the same fictional character, we still may know how to tell whether multiple fictions have 
one and the same author. But if we don't know how to tell whether multiple possible 
worlds contain the same person, we won't be able to tell whether multiple possible worlds 
contain the same people who are the parents of that person. In the fiction case, we can 
reach a point of solidity—the author—on which to ground identity statements. In the 
possibility case, appeal to the parents just pushes the same problem back a generation. 
There's just no parallel to the fiction solution. 
However, there's another problem of identity in fiction in which there may be a 
sharper parallel with the modal case. There are many cases of historical figures appearing 
in works of fiction, and we need some way to explain how the same person can be flesh 
and blood in the real world and be an abstract object in a work of fiction. Similarly, if we 
9 Or at least, there is no problem of identity specific to these sorts of cases. The only problem of identity 
is the problem of identity over time in general. 
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have an abstract object theory of possible worlds, we have to ask how a person can be 
flesh and blood in this world but merely abstract in other possible worlds. 
First, what do abstract object theories about fiction have to say in regards to 
fictions containing historical characters?  Peter van Inwagen claims that when Tolstoy 
ascribes vanity to Napoleon in War and Peace, he is not doing the same sort of thing that 
Dickens is doing when he ascribes fatness to Mrs. Gamp in Martin Chuzzlewit.10 Van 
Inwagen does suggest that it “may” (italics his) be the case that sometimes when critics 
talk about Napoleon in War and Peace, they talk about a fictional creature called 
“Napoleon” that is numerically distinct from the actual Napoleon, but this proposal, even 
if true in limited cases, seems far-fetched as an overarching proposal of how to handle 
historical fiction. The point of writing about historical figures is to write about historical  
figures, not about purely fictional entities that bear some resemblance to historical 
figures. 
Thomasson makes a similar point when arguing for her analysis over Zalta's 
encoding model. She supposes a story in which Richard Nixon marries a queen and 
becomes a prince. She claims that because “Nixon is a prince” and “Hamlet is a prince” 
both occur in the same contexts (fiction) and have the same form (“X is a prince”), they 
should be analyzed in the same way. But Zalta cannot analyze them the same way, 
because people are concrete and thus cannot encode properties. She also considers a 
proposal that real people have fictional surrogates that appear in their places in historical 
fiction, but rejects it for the same reasons we rejected van Inwagen's consideration: 
historical fiction needs to be about historical figures themselves—it loses its force if it 
10 Van Inwagen, Peter. “Creatures of Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly. 306. 
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isn't actually about historical people or places or events. According to Thomasson, the 
historical figures appearing in fiction should be the genuine article, the real, concrete 
historical figures. She also insists that ascription of properties in a work of fiction should 
work the same whether historical figures or creatures of fiction are involved, which 
separates her from both Zalta and van Iwagen. Using this principle, she develops a 
pretense view on which an “according to the fiction” operator is added to statements both 
about historical figures and about fictional characters.11
Of course, for the identity comparison, the important part of how sentences about 
historical figures in fiction get analyzed is how we manage to find the same people in 
both history and in fiction. If historical fiction is to be about historical figures in any 
meaningful way, there must be a way that historical figures appear. Either there is an 
abstract object that is identical to the historical figure but (similar to the surrogate 
proposal, except with an identity relation) it would do the job, but would also require an 
identity relation between an abstract object and a concrete one that van Inwagen and 
Thomasson seem to see as so implausible as to not even be worth considering. And 
indeed, it's hard to see how an object could be both actually abstract and actually 
concrete, perhaps even at the same time.  The other option, which both van Inwagen and 
Thomasson take, is that historical fiction is a case where real, concrete historical figures 
appear alongside abstract objects in works of fiction. 
When handled in this way, there is no real problem of identity of a character 
across fictions (or from a fiction to the real world). Unlike in the case of regular fiction, 
the temptation to identify historical figures by their properties is either greatly lessened or 
11 Thomasson. Fiction and Metaphysics. 104-105. 
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entirely gone. The way to tell whether it's really Napoleon in War and Peace is to ask 
Tolstoy if he was talking about Napoleon. The solution here is actually quite similar to 
the solution for regular fiction. Fictional characters (and people) are individuated by facts 
about their origins, and to answer questions about whether we're talking about the same 
fictional character (person) across two stories (across a story and the real world), we need 
to ask the author of the second story (story) whether or not they were talking about the 
same character (person) from the first story (real world). 
So if the solution is similar, will the parallel to transworld identity be any 
different? Previously, we were considering transworld identity across two arbitrary 
possible worlds. But that's not how it's done in the typical case. Typically, we ask identity 
questions about people in the actual world and people in another possible world. And that 
comparison can be handled in a way that's quite similar to the case of historical fiction. In 
the case of historical fiction, say Napoleon in War and Peace, we don't have an abstract 
Napoleon and a question of whether he's identical to the concrete Napoleon. We just have 
a concrete Napoleon that appears both in the real, concrete world and in an abstract work 
of fiction. And, depending on our metaphysics of modality, we could see just the same 
thing happening in the case of possible worlds. On a Lewisian interpretation, we have 
infinite concrete worlds and concrete people in all of them. He sees talking about identity 
between two concrete objects in different worlds to involve claims equally implausible as 
the ones that led van Inwagen and Thomasson to not consider a theory of historical 
fiction where there's an abstract object that's identical to a concrete one. But on a different 
interpretation, we have concrete objects in the actual world that also appear in other 
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possible worlds. It's not that they're duplicated in other possible worlds, it's just that the 
other possible worlds are about them in some sense. Napoleon is contained in another 
possible world in the same way that he is contained in a work of fiction—as himself. 
Of course, Napoleon doesn't get in another possible world in the same way he gets 
into a fiction (that is, there's no writer looking at the actual world and writing up another 
possible world based in part on it). But the ontology is the same, even if the origins are 
not. Concrete objects appear in abstract states of affairs. In one case, it's an artifactual 
state of affairs and in another sense, it's a complete and eternal state of affairs, but in both 
cases, it's a concrete object appearing in an abstract state of affairs. There is no problem 
of identity, because there's no appearance of there being two things. Just like Tolstoy 
didn't create a second Napoleon, other possible worlds don't have a second Napoleon. 
They just have the regular Napoleon appearing in different circumstances. 
This response seems the most plausible, and I suspect a metaphysical picture 
along these lines are what drives the Kripkean view that transworld identity is a pseudo-
problem. Because a second (or apparently second) object never comes into play, we don't 
have to ask whether the objects are identical. Just as we look in War and Peace and see 
that it's about Napoleon, we talk about the possible worlds that contain Napoleon. Not 
another merely possible object that's identical with Napoleon. Not a Tolstoy-created 
fictional artifact that's identical with Napoleon. Just plain old Napoleon. In both cases, 
the key is that we already have Napoleon—the actual Napoleon in the actual world. Of 
course, it is a further question how we get Napoleon in the first place. When talking of 
fiction, it's simple enough—the actual world is clearly there before historical fiction can 
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be written. But the parallel solution here may suggest that the actual world also has 
priority over merely possible worlds. 
Of course, there is still a question of identifying merely possible individuals. But 
if we're inclined towards a view in which the actual world has some priority, we may then 
be able to make a comparison between merely possible individuals and possible fictions. 
We can, I think, make claims about whether a fictional character in another possible 
world would have been Sherlock Holmes. We make such a determination based on 
whether that world contains Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and about whether Conan Doyle 
created that fictional character, and perhaps other facts about the manner of that creation 
(I don't expect to be able to pin down the exact conditions in which we'd have identity, 
and I suspect there are cases that are easily disputable, but the main point is that there are 
cases in which we could look at a possible fictional character and confidently identify 
him with our actual Holmes). If the actual world has priority, we can do something 
similar with the merely possible. One way—perhaps not the only way, but a Kripkean 
one—of cashing out that priority is with a claim that possible worlds contain only actual 
material. Possible people are combinations of actual sperms and eggs. In this case, we 
can identify two mere possibilia based on their relationship to something actual, just as 
we can identify possible Holmes based on their relationship to Conan Doyle. Solving the 
identity problem in this way will have farther reaching consequences as well, which we 
shall see in sections V and VI. But first, we should move to the second of our initial 
problems. 
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iv.  How Do You Hold Your Properties?
A second tricky problem in realist theories of fiction in general, and the artifactual 
theory in particular, is that of exactly what relation the fictional entities have to the  
properties ascribed to them in the fiction. If Sherlock Holmes is an abstract object, then 
Sherlock Holmes cannot smoke a pipe. Pipe-smoking is something that simply cannot be 
done by any abstract object, Holmes or otherwise. But Sherlock Holmes is described by 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle as a pipe-smoker. If “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe” appeared 
in the true/false section of a middle school English test, the answer would be “true.” 
As we've seen, Zalta proposes an exemplifying/encoding distinction. Concrete 
objects exemplify properties, abstract objects encode properties. So we can still truly say 
that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe because Holmes encodes the property of pipe-
smoking, even though he doesn't exemplify it. 
It's still not totally clear exactly what this distinction consists in, but van Inwagen 
makes a similar distinction between a character exemplifying a property and having a 
property ascribed to it.12 If his distinction is taken as a different fleshing out of the 
exemplifying/encoding distinction, it adds a third place to the encoding relation, making 
it a three-place relation, taking a property, an object, and a place. The place, he says “is 
either a work of fiction (such as a novel, short story, or narrative poem) or a part or 
12 Van Inwagen himself admits that this terminology is bad (“Creatures of Fiction,” 306), because one can 
ascribe properties to objects in non-fiction, and that's quite different than ascribing properties in fiction. 
If Conan Doyle ascribes a property to Holmes in one of his novels, Holmes has that property ascribed to 
him, in van Inwagen's technical sense. But if I ascribe a property to Holmes in my essay about fiction, 
Holmes does not necessarily have that property ascribed to him, in van Inwagen's technical sense. So 
the term is, at the very least, misleading and divergent from ordinary use. But van Inwagen doesn't see 
any other terms that aren't misleading. That said,  following R.M. Sainsbury in his exposition of the 
distinction in Fiction and Fictionalism, I'll stick with “encoding” language. 
section thereof, even a part or section that is so short as to be conterminous with a single 
(occurrence of a) sentence or clause.”13 
Already, we can see that this is importantly different than Zalta's encoding 
distinction. For Zalta, an abstract object encodes what it encodes necessarily, and at all 
times. For van Inwagen, an abstract object encodes something contingently and at a place
—it can easily not encode the same property at some other place. Sherlock Holmes does 
not encode the property of pipe-smoking in Fourth Mansions (which doesn't include 
Holmes at all), but he does in Conan Doyle novels. The place of the encoding can be 
made even more specific, as van Inwagen allows the place to be about as short as can 
make meaningful property attributions. This is done so that we can say things like 
“Sherlock Holmes is smoking a pipe at one point in the novel but is not smoking a pipe at 
another point.” Were the places less fine-grained, this would amount to saying that 
Holmes encodes pipe-smoking and not pipe-smoking at the same place, which seems 
contradictory. But with fine-grained places, we can say that Holmes encodes pipe-
smoking and not pipe-smoking in the same novel, but not at the same place in the novel. 
Encoding as a three-place relation already should begin to look familiar. After all,  
encoding a property in a particular fiction (or particular part of a fiction) is not terribly 
different than exemplifying a property at a particular time, or exemplifying a property in 
a particular world. We have a choice of whether to see each as a three-place relation or as 
an indexed property, but the underlying structure is the same in all cases. 
So what does this familiarity tell us? That perhaps this encoding/exemplifying 
distinction isn't so spooky and obscure after all. If we want to take seriously the idea that 
13 Van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,” 305.
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the same person can have different properties in different possible worlds, we already 
need some sort of three-place relation that takes an object, a property, and a world.14 So 
the encoding relation, while giving us new machinery to analyze objects and properties, 
demands no heavy ontological burden—it is a small modification on something we 
already have. 
We do need some modification, because if a world is a maximal state of affairs, 
then a fiction is certainly not a world, as a fiction is not maximal. But we could easily 
enough say that the three-place relation takes an object, a property, and a state of affairs. 
This would give us one relation that covers ascribing properties to objects in fiction, 
ascribing properties to objects in other possible worlds, and even ascribing properties to 
objects in the actual world. Of course, there would be some details to work out. In 
shifting from a place to a state of affairs, we've lost the fine-grainedness that allowed us 
to say that Holmes smoked a pipe at one point in the story but refrained at another point. 
But we have the same problem with properties in possible worlds. In the actual world, I 
was in Tennessee on November 20, 2012, but I was not in Tennessee on November 26, 
2012. This sort of case occurs all over the place in the actual world, and occurs all over 
the place in possible worlds, so there's no reason its occurrence in fiction should pose any 
particular problems. 
But this sort of generalized relation still has at least one major problem: the object 
in the first-place is abstract in the case of fiction and concrete in the case of the actual 
world. And, as we said earlier, an abstract object cannot, by virtue of being abstract, 
14 Alternatively, we could have world-indexed properties, but as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
the underlying structure is the same—such have an obvious parallel in the case of fiction. 
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exemplify many of the properties that concrete objects exemplify. So it seems like we 
must draw a further distinction that cordons off the fictional cases from the rest of the 
cases. And again, it poses a problem with historical fiction. After all, van Inwagen does 
not want to say that Napoleon encodes the property of being vain in War and Peace, 
Despite the fact that Tolstoy attributes vanity to Napoleon in War and Peace. Napoleon, 
not being a fictional character, is just not the sort of thing that can stand in this particular 
relation.15 
And now we're subject to the familiar objection from Thomasson, that the 
encoding/exemplifying distinction treats sentences differently that should be treated the 
same. When we say “Napoleon is vain,” talking of War and Peace, and “Hercule Poirot is 
vain,” talking of any number of Agatha Christie novels, we should be saying the same 
sort of thing. But if real people cannot standing in this sort of relation, we not only must 
analyze them differently, but the exemplifying/encoding distinction gives us no help in 
dealing with historical fiction.
Following Thomasson, I find it more plausible to draw a distinction based on the 
place involved than based on the object involved. But unlike Thomasson, I don't want to 
crush the encoding/exemplifying distinction entirely and wholly retreat to pretense, out of 
the concern that pretense leaves truth out of the picture. Instead, I'd like modify the 
distinction to capture that crucial intuition that the place—not the object—is the key.  
Rather than saying that abstract objects are the sorts of things that encode properties and 
concrete objects are the sorts of things that exemplify properties, why not rather say that 
objects encode properties in certain settings and exemplify them in other settings. 
15 IBID, 306. 
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Napoleon can encode properties in War and Peace while exemplifying them in the real 
world. Sherlock Holmes can encode the property of pipe-smoking in Conan Doyle's 
novels, while he would exemplify it in the real world if Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe 
in the real world.16 
Here we have a broader three-place relation that encompasses both encoding and 
exemplifying. If the third place in the relation is the actual world, it is an exemplification 
relation. If the third place in the relation is a fiction, it is an encoding relation. And this  
maps on to our intuitions about fiction in a way that we could not before, when we tried 
to make the encoding/exemplifying distinction based on the sort of object involved. 
“Napoleon is vain,” when speaking of War and Peace, should be treated the same as 
“Poirot is vain,” when speaking of Christie's novels. But “Napoleon is vain,” when 
speaking of War and Peace, seems interestingly different than “Napoleon is vain” when 
speaking of history. The way in which Napoleon relates to vanity in real life seems more 
robust than the way in which he relates to vanity in War and Peace. The additional 
robustness doesn't stem from it being Napoleon. Napoleon is the same person in both 
cases. It's about the setting. 
So we have one general three-place relation, and have claimed that encoding and 
exemplification are special cases of it—it can be an encoding relation or an 
exemplification relation depending on what takes the third place of the relation. We have 
argued that this maps onto our intuitions much more closely than the initially proposed 
distinctions. And it seems clear that if the third place is a fiction, we have encoding, and 
16 That it is impossible for Holmes to smoke a pipe makes no difference to the fact that, were he actually 
smoking a pipe, he would exemplify the property of pipe-smoking. 
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if the third place is the actual world, we have exemplification. But what if the third place 
is another possible world? We'll pick up this question in Section V, but first, we should 
say more about what the third place is. 
We started with the idea that the third place was a world (or perhaps something 
slightly more specific, like a world at a time) but quickly moved into state of affairs talk. 
This seems natural, as one familiar way of defining a possible world is as a maximally 
consistent state of affairs. But this is not meant to be a decision about what a possible 
world truly is. There should still be room for a theory that doesn't define a possible world 
in such terms. However, use of states of affairs allows us to apply the relation more 
generally to fictions in addition to worlds, so it is worth preserving the use of states of 
affairs even if we do not define a possible world in those terms. 
It should not be too difficult to maintain states of affairs as the objects taking the 
third place in the relation without committing to states of affairs as a definition of 
possible worlds. If a possible world indeed is just a maximally consistent state of affairs, 
all the better. But what if a possible world is a concrete universe spatiotemporally 
disconnected from ours? In that case, we can in principle give a complete description of 
that world. And that description, in addition to describing a world, will describe a state of 
affairs. Call this the state of affairs associated with the world. This should allow us to be 
more general. No matter what a possible world is, as long as we have states of affairs in 
our ontology, we should be able to find the state of affairs associated with the possible 
world. So, for the sake of generality, rather than being a world, let the object taking the 
third place in the relation be the state of affairs associated with a world. 
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Why go through the (albeit minimal) trouble of going from worlds to states of 
affairs? While worlds were general enough for analyzing modal property-attribution, they 
do not suffice for extending to fiction, as fictions do not clearly involve worlds. There are 
those who think they do, but there are strong arguments against this view (for starters, 
fictions are not complete descriptions of a state of affairs, and whatever else we can say 
about worlds, they're big—a description of a world should be complete). 
So is a fiction a state of affairs? Not quite. The identity conditions for states of 
affairs are too stringent to apply to fictions. If we have a state of affairs in which Sherlock 
Holmes plays the violin, then any state of affairs in which Sherlock Holmes does not play 
the violin but rather the viola is not the same state of affairs. But surely Conan Doyle 
could have written Sherlock Holmes stories in which Holmes plays the viola instead of 
the violin (of course, they would not have been as good. But, as I'll argue below, he could 
have done it). 
So a fiction cannot be a state of affairs. But a fiction, like a possible world, can 
have an associated state of affairs. The difference is that this association is not necessary. 
It makes no sense to talk about how a possible world could've been different. To say that 
a possible world could've been different is to misunderstand what it is to be a possible 
world. If someone does say that a world could've been different, they almost certainly 
mean that there is another possible world that is different. The identity conditions are 
strict. Any change in the content of a possible world does not alter the possible world but 
rather describes a different possible world. 
Fiction is not like this. The Sherlock Holmes stories could have had Holmes 
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playing the viola. They wouldn't have been different stories, they would've been the same 
stories with a few modifications—different versions of the same stories. The identity 
conditions for a story have to do at least in part with its origins. They almost certainly 
also include something about the content of the story, but certainly not every single detail 
has to be the same for the story to be the same. So when we take the state of affairs 
associated with the Sherlock Holmes stories, we are talking about the state of affairs 
associated with the actual Sherlock Holmes stories. There are merely possible versions of 
the Sherlock Holmes stories associated with other states of affairs, and there's an 
epistemic possibility that we could find a lost Sherlock Holmes story that describes a 
different state of affairs than the ones we know. If we wanted to talk about the possible 
world in which Conan Doyle writes Holmes as playing the viola, we have another state of 
affairs associated with this possible version of the story. But while versions of stories, 
like possible worlds, have stricter identity conditions than stories themselves. So when 
we actually attribute violin-playing to Holmes, the third place in the relation is filled by 
the state of affairs associated with the actual Sherlock Holmes stories. 
This allows us to get the needed generality. Because a place isn't defined as a 
world or a story, it allows this relation to be used for both worlds and stories. And in the 
latter case, it also makes things more precise. If what took the third place in the relation 
attributing the property of violin-playing to Holmes was the Holmes stories, we would 
need an “actually” operator. The Holmes stories could have been different, so we would 
need to make sure we were attributing the property in the actual Holmes stories rather 
than in a possible modification of them. But using states of affairs does this work for us, 
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because states of affairs cannot be different. When we attribute violin-playing to Holmes, 
we go to the state of affairs associated with the actual story. 
It may seem that our analysis of the three-place relation is open to the following 
objection: if we grant that Sherlock Holmes exemplifies being an abstract object in the 
actual world and that the Sherlock Holmes in the stories is the same Holmes created by 
Conan Doyle in the actual world, should we not grant that Holmes exemplifies being an 
abstract object in the fiction? After all, the fiction appears in the actual world, and it  
contains an actual object Sherlock Holmes. And since that object exemplifies being 
abstract in the actual world, it should in the stories as well. This would be a problem. If 
Holmes exemplifies being an abstract object in the stories, then the whole basis for 
drawing the distinction comes apart. We wanted it to be the case that whether an object 
exemplifies or encodes a property depends on the place in which the relation occurs. In 
fictional contexts, we have encoding. In the actual world, we have exemplification. But if  
Holmes exemplifies being abstract in the stories, this distinction has failed. However, if 
we were to claim that Holmes encodes being abstract in the stories, we would also run 
into trouble. We've already granted that Holmes encodes being a concrete object in the 
stories, so if he were also to encode being abstract, he would encode contradictory 
properties. 
This objection is primarily motivated by and aimed at the account of fiction that 
sees Holmes as an abstract artifact created by Conan Doyle. The stories are, on this view, 
a part of the actual world, and the Holmes contained in the stories is the same abstract 
artifact created by Conan Doyle. If Holmes is an abstract artifact in the actual world, he 
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doesn't suddenly become non-abstract in some part of the actual world (that is, in the 
fiction). So in the fiction, he must be abstract in some sense. And whether he encodes or 
exemplifies, it causes problems for this method of handling fiction. 
The best way to handle this objection is to reject the push to claim that Holmes is 
in any sense abstract in the stories. This rejection may seem natural to some and hand-
wavy to others, but a parallel example should clarify the intuitive pull behind the 
rejection and make it seem the natural choice. Consider, rather than “being abstract” and 
“being concrete,” the properties “being created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle” and “being 
born of Mr. and Mrs. Holmes.”17 These are exclusive in much the same way that 
abstractness and concreteness are exclusive. On our interpretation, it seems clear that 
Holmes exemplifies being created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in the actual world and 
encodes being born of Mr. and Mrs. Holmes in the stories. If this objection is to be 
moving, there must be some intuitive pull towards saying that in the stories Holmes is 
created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. But in the stories (which are absent any meta-
fictional elements that might give us pause), there is no pull at all to say that Holmes is 
created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Surely Holmes and the stories as a whole are created 
by Conan Doyle, but in the stories they are not created by Conan Doyle. 
Abstractness and concreteness are properties that are harder on the intuitions than 
being born of Mr. and Mrs. Holmes and being created by Conan Doyle, but the situation 
is parallel, and the parallel shows that the objection should be rejected. Holmes is not in 
any sense abstract in the stories. Certainly Holmes is an abstract object that the stories are 
17 We choose this comparison because we've talked about origins, but we could just as easily contrast 
properties like “being popular with readers” and “being sought-after for crime-solving.” 
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about, but he is not abstract in the stories, just as he is not created by Conan Doyle in the 
stories. 
The reasoning behind the objection is similar to that behind the idea that the same 
person cannot appear with different properties in multiple worlds, so counterpart theorists 
may still be attracted to it. But if the same object can have different properties in different 
worlds, Holmes being abstract in the actual world shouldn't force him to be abstract in the 
stories. This may be obscured in the particular example, but we can see from the parallel 
that it holds. 
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v.  How Parallel is Parallel?
Of course, even if we accept both this understanding of the three-place relation 
and this artifactual theory of fiction, there are still questions, closely related to those set 
aside in the previous section, about how far to take the parallel between fictions and 
possible worlds. The most extreme response would be to say that the fictions are just 
identical to possible worlds, albeit perhaps underspecified when written about. This 
seems clearly ruled out by appeal to the artifactual theory of fiction, unless one is inclined 
to say that merely possible objects are artifacts. The necessity of origins thesis seems 
intuitively gripping, and as we've seen, it can be applied easily enough to fiction. Just as I 
may have had the parents I had essentially, Sherlock Holmes was essentially created by 
Conan Doyle—a Holmes-like character created by Agatha Christie just wouldn't have 
been Holmes. But if Holmes is just a possible person who is a flesh and blood individual 
in other worlds, he wouldn't have been created by Conan Doyle in those other worlds. So 
if the necessity of origins thesis is correct regarding fictional characters, fictions cannot 
just be examples of possible worlds. 
 However, this is not the only reason to rule out this extreme conclusion. Another 
point weighing against it is the familiar problem of reference. If Sherlock Holmes were a 
merely possible person, how would Conan Doyle be able to refer to him? There's no one 
Conan Doyle could point to and say “I'm talking about that guy,” and there could be 
many possible people that have all of the properties ascribed to Holmes, so Conan Doyle 
can't just be picking out Holmes as “the possible person that has such and such 
properties.” It seems as though Conan Doyle has no way to refer to a particular merely 
possible individual, and if he cannot refer to such an individual, it seems unlikely he 
would be able to write about them. 
So if we are to generally accept an artifactual theory of fiction and an 
encoding/exemplifying distinction but are to reject the idea that fictions just are possible 
worlds, what are the remaining options. Three general strategies emerge, and one's 
preference among the three should vary based on how tightly one sees the connection 
between fictions and possible worlds. Recall that, in introducing the three-place relation 
and how it ties into the exemplifying/encoding distinction, we said that when the third 
place of the relation is the actual world, it is an exemplification relation, and when the 
third place is a fiction, it is an encoding relation. But what should we do if the third place 
is a merely possible world? We could, if we see possible worlds as just the same sorts of 
things as the actual world and quite different from worlds of fiction, see this as an 
example of exemplification. On the other hand, if we see tighter parallels between 
possible worlds and worlds of fiction, we could see this as a relation of encoding. The 
third option would be to see it as neither. Each option has its strengths and weaknesses, 
which we shall consider in turn. 
The first strategy, saying that we have exemplification when the third place of the 
relation is a merely possible world, can be supported by observing the differences 
between possible worlds and worlds of fiction and by appeal to a uniformity in the nature 
of possible worlds. On the former point, we should note that possible worlds are not 
artifacts. They are not created by us and they do not come into existence at some point in 
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time. Furthermore, states of affairs that comprise works of fiction are rarely, if ever, 
maximal and can be self-contradictory. Possible worlds are maximal and must be 
consistent. Finally, the actual world and merely possible worlds are both subsumed under 
the category of possible worlds. To the degree that that indicates uniformity, if we see that 
the relation in the actual world is exemplification, we should expect the same from 
possible worlds. 
However, one thing this first option doesn't do is capture what's special about the 
actual world. For those inclined toward Lewis in thinking that actuality is merely an 
indexical, this won't be terribly moving. But for those not Lewis-inclined in this matter, it 
seems clear that the actual world is special. Possible worlds are full of things that could 
have happened. Merely possible worlds are full of things that could have and didn't 
happen. But the actual world is full of what has actually happened. Even if, before it was 
made actual, the actual world was the same sort of thing as other possible worlds, 
actuality seems to introduce a pretty big difference. Before we roll two dice, all 36 
possible outcomes are equal. But once we roll them and see a pair of sixes, that outcome 
becomes relevantly different than the others—it's the one that happened. And it can be 
hard to cash out exactly in what the difference consists. The actual world seems more real 
in some sense. But if we admit possible worlds into our ontology, then unless we're 
prepared to grade out varying levels of reality, merely saying the actual world is more 
real isn't the way to cash out the intuition. 
But the same intuition holds about the way objects hold their actual properties 
compared to how fictional objects hold the properties ascribed to them in fiction. So if the 
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exemplification/encoding distinction works for that intuition, why can't it work here? In 
the actual world, we have exemplification, and in merely possible worlds, like in fiction, 
we have encoding. This, our second option, makes use of the similarities between the 
fictional and the merely possible to capture something special about the actual world. 
However, in doing so, it ignores the differences between the fictional and the merely 
possible. We've discussed several differences, and they may indicate that the parallel is 
not strong enough to lump the merely possible in with the fictional in the encoding 
relation while exemplification occurs in the actual world alone. 
The third option is to claim that the exemplification/encoding distinction is  
missing a middle option for the merely possible. After all, while it did seem that a 
distinction needed to be made, there was no knockdown argument saying the distinction 
should be made between only two things. Why not three? This approach emphasizes the 
difference between the fictional, the merely possible, and the actual. If the merely 
possible is different enough from the actual world to cast doubt on exemplification 
occurring there and different enough from the fictional to cast similar doubt on encoding, 
why not just make the distinction tripartite? The downside of this approach, of course, is 
parsimony. The reasons for drawing an exemplification/encoding distinction were 
extremely compelling, and to make a tripartite distinction, we should have similarly 
compelling evidence that the exemplification/encoding distinction, as it stands, is not 
fine-grained enough to do the job. 
We will require further analysis of exactly how the exemplification and encoding 
relations are restricted in various places. This should yield insight into exactly how deep 
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the parallel runs. A difference between the fictional and the possible that we have only 
briefly touched on is that the possible is, in fact, possible. Given that Sherlock Holmes is 
created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, it may be impossible that he is born of Mr. and Mrs. 
Holmes. But that doesn't stop him from being born of Mr. and Mrs. Holmes in the stories, 
and it doesn't stop him from encoding the property of being born of Mr. and Mrs. 
Holmes. So the encoding relation is not fully bound by the chains of possibility. 
However, it is somewhat constrained by possibility. Perhaps time travel is impossible, 
and thus Napoleon taking part in a history presentation in California in 1988 is 
impossible. But he does successfully encode that property in Bill and Ted's Excellent  
Adventure. However, it is much less clear that Napoleon could encode the property of 
being born in 1988 in California to 5th-generation American parents. It seems as though, 
if someone were to write a fiction in which Napoleon did that, it wouldn't be about 
Napoleon anymore. So the properties that Napoleon actually exemplifies does provide 
some constraint, although not complete constraint, on what Napoleon can encode. And, if 
the relation in the case of merely possible worlds is encoding, then the constraint on 
encoding in possible worlds is different from the constraint on encoding in fiction. This 
should not be surprising, given the differences between the two, but if seen as a 
difference in kind and not merely in degree, it may be ammunition for one inclined 
towards a tripartite distinction. 
Now that we've seen how the constraint works in possible worlds, how 
does it work in fiction? The encoding relation in possible worlds is obviously constrained 
by metaphysical possibility. But there are perfectly good fictions that are not 
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metaphysically possible. Of course, we have the preceding arguments about how fictions 
generally do not describe possible worlds and thus that the events of fiction, even fairly 
straightforward, realistic fiction, are not within the bounds of possibility. But fiction can 
break the bounds of possibility even more clearly than that. Nothing requires the physics 
of fiction to be bound by metaphysical possibility. Nothing requires fiction to even be 
consistent! It is fairly common to find continuity errors in works of fiction, yielding 
internal contradictions. No one rejects them as fictions on the grounds that they contain 
contradictions. 
Perhaps one might claim that contradictions in fiction are not reasons to reject the 
fiction as a whole but the reason to reject a particular property ascription. For example, 
an author may introduce a character as six feet tall and later list him at 5'10”. But should 
we say that the story itself has a contradiction or that the author misdescribed a consistent 
story? One may think any theory including an author misdescribing a consistent story 
need require a pre-existent third realm of stories that the author only discovers, which 
seems inconsistent with the robust sort of creation we'd like to see in authorship. But 
misdescribing a consistent story need not require such a view—rather it needs only that 
the act of creating the world does not mesh perfectly with the act of putting pen to paper. 
The author could have created a consistent story in imagination but neglected small 
details and misreported them. This is, of course, speculative, but it would allow us not to 
worry about these small contradictions, perhaps giving us the ability to say that encoding 
in fiction is at least constrained by logical possibility. 
But even if we were to grant that such continuity errors are not inconsistencies in 
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fiction, we run into larger problems when we see more important contradictions. These 
come out best in time travel stories. Time travel stories are often have vital elements of  
the plot that are entirely incoherent. And yet they remain fictions. In fact, time travel plots  
are often incoherent in such a way that the incoherencies not only fail to decrease the 
audience's appreciation of the fiction but actually facilitate the audience's appreciation. 18 
And these certainly cannot be explained away in any easy fashion. The author isn't 
misreporting a coherent story. The stories themselves are incoherent. 
So we must allow inconsistencies in fiction, which means encoding in fiction 
cannot be constrained by even logical possibility. Clearly then they are not constrained by 
physical or metaphysical possibility. Even the consistent time travel stories at best elicit  
controversy as to their metaphysical possibility. 
So if encoding is not constrained in fiction by physical, metaphysical, or logical 
possibility, what is it constrained by? One initially plausible answer might be essence. 
This would be a surprising answer, as it would mean fictions are constrained by 
something more restrictive than logical possibility (essence, which pertains to 
metaphysical possibility) while at the same time being constrained by something less 
restrictive, in that it allows contradictions. However, there are intuitions in favor of the 
proposal. Napoleon may be able to travel in time in fiction, even in ways that might not 
be metaphysically or even logically possible, but Napoleon must still be Corsican, right? 
Of course, determining individual essence is an enormously difficult task in and of itself, 
but a difficult to pin down constraint on encoding is better than an entirely unknown one. 
Unfortunately, we can easily show that individual essence will in fact not do the 
18 Two prime examples here would be Back to the Future and Looper. There are many others. 
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job. It seems to work in the case of Napoleon. His essential properties, whatever they 
may be—perhaps being Corsican, being male, being human, having such and such 
parents, etc.—seem to constrain how he appears in fiction. But for fictional characters 
themselves, this is not so. We have argued that it is essential to Sherlock Holmes that he 
was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. But we have also argued that in the Sherlock 
Holmes stories, Holmes is not created by Conan Doyle but is rather born of two human 
parents. So one of Holmes' central, essential properties, does not hold of him in all stories 
in which he appears. In fact, it fails to hold of Holmes in most of the stories in which he 
actually appears—the property would only hold of him in a story with some meta-
fictional elements. 
But it does seem that Holmes must still be British. And perhaps he must be male, 
although the recasting of male characters as women, which is not unusual in the recent 
past, certainly introduces questions on that score. And perhaps he must have the same 
parents in all stories, although we may think it possible to write a Sherlock Holmes story 
in which he discovers he's adopted. The only constraints on what properties Holmes can 
encode are those that, if violated, would cause us to look at a purported Holmes story and 
say “No, that's not about him. That's about some other character being passed off as 
Holmes.” And it's hard to say exactly what properties those are. Facts about his creation 
and the reference of future writers to Conan Doyle's Holmes character certainly do not 
come into play, as they exist outside the world of the stories. Whatever facts constrain 
what properties Holmes can encode in fiction, they are notably difficult to pin down—
which is why there is room for argument about whether or not two characters are the 
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same—and are not just the set facts about Holmes' essence, at least in the ordinary sense 
of “essence,” where it is taken to include facts about what is metaphysically possible for 
Holmes. We will consider potential, so to speak, fictional essences which could constraint 
Holmes in fiction. It will turn out that this will not be directly parallel to the case of 
actual people (for instance, requiring that parentage remain constant but allowing 
intellectual prowess to vary) but will require a contextual concept. 
Now it may seem strange to allow an object to encode properties that go against 
the essence of that object, as the essence of something seems like it ought to go beyond 
even the restrictions put in place by metaphysical and logical possibility. And indeed, it is  
strange, and a strangeness that may be unique to fictional artifacts. What Napoleon can 
encode seems to be constrained by his essence, even though what Holmes can encode is 
not. But, strange as it may be, this is just another step on a continuum of constraints on 
encoding. We already allow objects to encode in metaphysically possible worlds 
something that would have been banned in physically possible worlds. We allow objects 
to encode in logically possible worlds something that would have been banned in 
metaphysically possible worlds. And we allow objects to encode in fiction things that 
would've been banned in logically possible worlds. That we lose essence, and that it's 
hard to pin down what to replace it with, is a strange quirk, but it's just another along a 
continuum of allowances which are strange with respect to the next most restrictive class 
of worlds. And it seems the existence of such a continuum takes back any ammunition we 
had previously given to the supporter of a tripartite distinction, and our discussion is 
again turns to two options: that merely possible worlds are more parallel to the actual 
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world than to fiction and vice versa. 
While not a complete answer, context of introduction may provide a potential 
insight into how this continuum of constraints on the encoding relation behaves. Sherlock 
Holmes is introduced in a particular context that is controlled largely by his creator. What 
features can encoded by Holmes in any possible or fictional worlds depends on that 
context, on what Conan Doyle chose to make Holmes' key properties. While it seems 
obvious that Holmes could give up smoking or playing the violin, it also seems any 
character without a brilliant mind and unsocial personality would not be Holmes. In fact, 
it seems much more obvious that these traits must be encoded by Holmes in all possible 
stories about him than that Holmes must have the parents he actually did—a property 
much less central to the stories. 
These key properties are tied into a character's creation so inextricably that any 
character without those properties would not be the same character. But this is a 
phenomenon unique to fiction. Ordinary people are not introduced by particular authors 
in particular contexts, which is why Napoleon in fiction is constrained in much the same 
way that Napoleon in possible worlds are constrained. In some ways, he is more 
constrained than Holmes—after all, he definitely must have the same parents in all 
worlds and in all stories—but in other ways, he is less. Napoleon could have not been a 
brilliant leader, but to take from Holmes his brilliance would be to create another 
character entirely. Where he's less constrained, it's because he, like all ordinary people, 
already exist for anyone to write about. There is no author that gets any kind of first dibs, 
that gets to set a context for Napoleon's introduction into the world that would restrict the 
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properties he can encode. And where he's more constrained, it's for the same reason. He 
had no author to de-emphasize certain properties, like who his parents were, in his 
context of introduction, and so he encodes them in all possible worlds and in all fictions. 
A person comes into the world laden with their DNA and their causal history. A fictional 
character, on the other hand, may not have any specific DNA but may have other 
properties without which they simply would not be the same character. And while this 
may not always give a good answer for exactly how encoding is restricted, it does explain 
in part why fictional characters and actual people occupy different places on the 
continuum of how the encoding relation is constrained. Additionally, the constraint on 
both possibility and fiction by how an object is introduced in the actual world reinforces 
the parallel seen at the end of Section III between a possible world containing an actual 
person and a fiction containing an actual person.  
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vi.  A Word About Pretense
So we have seen a number of parallels between fiction and possibility, but we 
have not yet come to a conclusion on exactly how far to take the parallel. Should we take 
fictions to be incomplete, sometimes inconsistent instances of the same sorts of things—
albeit not the exact same things—as possible worlds, only dim reflections of the actual 
world? Or should we take possible worlds and the actual world to be very much the same 
and fictions to be quite different? There are certainly parallels between fictions and 
possible worlds, but there are also disanalogies. For those who don't see actuality as an 
indexical, the same holds between possible worlds and the actual world. There are many 
similarities, but the actual world is special in some way that merely possible worlds are 
not. It is the world that obtains, and our discussion in section III indicated that it claims 
some sort of priority over merely possible worlds, in much the same way as it has priority 
over fiction. But because there still are parallels to both, accepting the parallels we've 
discussed between possible worlds and fiction, even where they are suggestive, do not 
force a choice about whether these parallels are the stronger. 
But there is another component—also strongly suggestive about which parallels 
are stronger—that is absolutely vital to many theories of fiction but that we have thus far 
left to the side: pretense. Under many popular theories of fiction, including Thomasson's, 
when we make claims about what happens in a fiction, we don't really assert propositions 
as true, we merely pretend they are true. Sherlock Holmes doesn't really smoke a pipe, 
but we pretend that he does in order to enjoy the story, or it order to talk about it 
afterwards. 
While the driving intuition behind the use of pretense seems solid—abstract 
objects don't smoke pipes—I've always felt the theories lacking something. I know that 
abstract objects don't smoke pipes, and I find it plausible that Sherlock Holmes is an 
abstract object, but it seems obviously true that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe. That's 
the part that pretense theories miss. They miss the truth. 
However, recasting pretense in terms of encoding seems to capture both the 
pretense intuition and the truth intuition. When we assert propositions ascribing 
properties to objects, we don't usually specify whether we're talking about an encoding 
relation or an exemplification relation. In normal statements about the world, we're 
talking about exemplification. But when we assert that Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, 
it's not that we aren't asserting a proposition, it's that we are only asserting a proposition 
about encoding. Abstract objects don't exemplify pipe-smoking, but they can encode it. 
And that's exactly what we mean when we say that Holmes does. We don't actually 
expect to find a flesh and blood Holmes smoking a pipe in London. But we're also still 
asserting a proposition. 
When we pretend for the sake of a story, we're not pretending to assert a 
proposition; we're pretending that the proposition is about exemplification rather than 
encoding. Put differently, we're pretending that Holmes' actions are really happening and 
not happening in the creation of a long-dead writer. This explanation captures the 
pretense intuition without sacrificing truth in fiction. 
But does it give us insight into possible worlds? I would say it does. When we 
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consider other possible worlds—really consider other possible worlds, not just consider 
modal properties of actual objects—we are considering what things would be like were 
those worlds actual. But they aren't actual. We are only pretending. And if encoding is the 
best way to recast pretense in fiction, it seems the right way to recast pretense here. 
Sherlock Holmes really smokes a pipe in fiction just like I really drop out of college in 
another possible world. These are both true, in virtue of properties encoded by Holmes 
and me. But when we consider the world as if those things were real, we are pretending. 
We are treating an encoding relation as an exemplification relation. In this, possible 
worlds stand closer to fictions than the actual world, and those parallels should be spelled 
out in terms of how objects encode their properties in fictions and in possible worlds 
while they exemplify properties in the actual world. 
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